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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WALTER G. HENDERSON and
HELEN L. HENDERSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs

" "
HARRY R. MEYER and RONALD
EUGENE MEYER,
Defendants and Respondents.

\
J
J
I
/
I
I
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Case No.
13702

Brief of Defendants-Respondents
NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action against the defendants-respondents (hereafter called defendants) by plain tiff-appellant,
Helen L. Henderson, (hereafter called plaintiff) for damages for her claimed bodily injuries and by plaintiffappellant, Walter G. Henderson, for damages for his
claimed property damage and which was alleged to have
resulted from a two-car automobile accident that occurred
in Bountiful, Utah, on April 22, 1972.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial of the case was heard before the Honorable
Thornley K. Swan, District Judge, in and for Davis
1
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County, Utah, sitting with a jury, and on March 21,
1974, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action
in favor of both the defendants and as against both
plaintiffs, and judgment was duly entered thereon. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Judgment N.O.V.,
or in the Alternative for a New Trial and, after hearing,
the Honorable District Judge denied said Motions.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmance of the jury verdict and
judgment entered thereon by the Lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendants do not agree with the Statement of
Facts as contained in the appellants' Brief since the facts
are not fully set forth therein and, to the extent they are,
they are not stated in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party on this appeal, that being the defendants.
A full Statement of the Facts will be set out hereafter
and in the body of the Argument following Point I.
Because of this, and to avoid repetition, they will not
be recited here.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FACTUAL ISSUES DECIDED BY THE JURY
IN THIS CASE WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO
IT AND THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT.

On the subject matter of liability, the only issues
which the jury was called upon to decide were whether

2
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or not the defendant, Ronald Eugene Meyer, (hereafter
called Ronald Meyer or Mr. Meyer), was negligent immediately prior to the accident in question and, if so,
whether his negligence proximately caused the accident
in question and the injuries and damages claimed by the
plaintiffs. No claim was made at the trial by the defendants that the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent.
Also, it was conceded at the trial that if Ronald Meyer
(who was 17 years old at the time of the accident) was
liable, that so was the other defendant, Harry R. Meyer,
who was his father. This was so since the latter owned
the vehicle being driven by his son, Ronald Meyer, and,
further, since the father had also signed the son's application for driver's license. Therefore, and by reason of
the ownership and the signing, the father was responsible
for any liability of the son and under 41-2-22 U.C.A.,
1953, and 41-2-10 U.C.A., 1953, respectively.
Prior to considering the evidence relating to the disputed issues of liability in this case, it is appropriate to
have in mind certain principles. One of these is the
well-established rule that since the jury found the issues
in favor of the defendants, they are entitled to have this
Court consider all of the evidence, and every inference
and intendment fairly arising therefrom in the light most
favorable to the defendants' position. Toomer's Estate v.
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d
163; Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Railway Company,
40 Utah 483,123 P. 97. Another principle which should be
kept in mind and which is also well-established is that
the determination of facts under our judicial system is
left exclusively to the jury and its determination thereon

3
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is final excepting only where the evidence is so clear
that all reasonable minds would find one way and so
that a verdict contrary thereto must have resulted from
passion or prejudice, or misconception of the law or the
evidence, or in arbitrary disregard thereof. Lemmon v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 9
Utah 2d 195, 341 P.2d 215.
As is frequently the situation on appeals of this
kind, the party against whom the jury found seeks
to have this Court substitute its judgment on the facts
for the judgment of the jury. Therefore, and rather than
stating the facts in the light most favorable to the defendants, the plaintiffs in their Brief have often stated
facts in the light most favorable to them. The following
is believed to be a fair statement of the material facts
in this case bearing on the disputed issues of liability
and in the light most favorable to the defendants. All of
the facts hereafter stated are from the trial testimony
of Eonald Meyer (Tr. pp 52-60) and except as otherwise
indicated by a reference to another portion of the Transcript.
The plaintiff, Helen L. Henderson, brought this
action for damages for her personal injuries. The 1964
Mercury automobile which she was driving at the time
was registered in her husband's name, Walter G. Henderson, he being the other plaintiff. He was not in the
vehicle at the time of the accident, and his sole claim in
this lawsuit was for a small amount of property damage
to the vehicle.

4
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The accident in question occurred about noon on
Saturday, April 22, 1972, and it was a two vehicle accident with the left front of the Meyer vehicle colliding
with the right rear of the Henderson vehicle (Tr. p 44).
Prior to the collision, both vehicles had been northbound
on 200 West in Bountiful, Utah. That street has one
lane each way for north and southbound traffic. The
accident occurred in the block on 200 West between 400
South Street to the south of where the accident occurred
and 300 South to the north. Both Fourth and Third South
are streets traveling east and west and which intersect
at right angles to 200 West. Although not precisely stated
in the record, it appears that the point of the collision
occurred in the northbound lane on 200 West and approximately mid-way between Fourth and Third South Streets.
To the west from the point of collision was a Norge
Town Cleaners into which Mrs. Henderson was intending
to turn left (Tr. 71). She claimed that she had come up
and had been stopped waiting for southbound traffic to
go by before proceeding to make her left turn (Tr. 71).
Ronald Meyer testified that he thought Mrs. Henderson
was stopped when he first saw her, although he also
testified that he thought she had just stopped since her
rear bumper was still high.
Mr. Meyer testified that as he was proceeding north
on 200 West and just as he came through its intersection
with Fourth South that he first saw a white Rambler
station wagon to his right which was exiting from a
drive-in parking lot on to 200 West. At that time, Mr.
Meyer's speed was about 30 miles per hour and the speed
5
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limit on that street at that time was 35 miles per hour.
When Mr. Meyer saw the Eambler it was traveling from
east to west at right angles to him. He observed it while
it traveled a distance of approximately 100 feet and its
course was such that it was coming west toward where
he would be passing it northbound on 200 West. Mr.
Meyer testified that just before he got to where the
Rambler was exiting on to Second West and from this
driveway that he honked his horn at the Rambler. That
car then entered 200 West and with its front door about
over the gutter on the east side of the street. Mr. Meyer
testified that he moved to his left to avoid this Rambler
and "in case he [Rambler] did come out in the road
after I [Meyer] honked my horn" (Tr. 57). However,
the Rambler stopped. As Meyer passed in front of the
Rambler, he looked to his right rear out the rear window
of the pickup truck he was driving. Meyer didn't know
how long he looked, but it was only as he passed. When
he looked back to the road in front of him, the Henderson
vehicle was too close for him to be able to stop without
hitting it. Considering the position Mr. Meyer had observed her bumper in and indicating that she had just
stopped, it may have been that Mrs. Henderson slowed
and stopped her vehicle during the brief period Mr.
Meyer's attention was diverted by the Rambler. Immediately upon seeing her, Meyer applied his brakes and
swerved to his right. His travel speed had been approximately 30 miles per hour and the investigating officer
estimated from Meyer's skid marks that the latter had
reduced his speed to approximately 15 miles per hour at
impact (Tr. p 51). The extremely minor damage to the

6
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rear of the Henderson vehicle and as shown in the photograph of it admitted into evidence (defendant's Exhibit 1
in envelope attached to p. 24 of Eec.) may well have
caused the jury to conclude that Meyer's speed was even
less than 15 miles per hour upon impact.
It is clear from the testimony of Meyer that he was
concerned as he was traveling north that the Rambler
might enter the street and collide with him and as a
consequence thereof, his attention to the road ahead of
him was diverted away for a brief period. Moreover,
and on this point, Mrs. Henderson herself testified that
immediately after the accident that she had heard Mr.
Meyer tell the investigating officer that "he [Meyer]
thought the car [Rambler] was going to hit him" (Tr.
74).
Because of this claimed danger to Mr. Meyer from
the Rambler, the Court included among its instructions
to the jury the standard one on "Sudden Peril" that is
No. 15.4 from JIFU. (Court's Instruction No. 21A Rec.
p. 59). In essence, that instruction told the jury that if
they believed that Mr. Meyer had been suddenly confronted with peril arising from either the actual presence
or the appearance of imminent danger to himself that
he was not required to use the same judgment and
prudence as would have been required of him in the
absence of that peril. No objection or exception was
made or taken to the giving of this instruction to the
jury and it is obvious that no legitimate objection could
have been made since the evidence fairly presented an
issue involving that instruction.
7
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It is evident from the foregoing recitation of facts,
and as applied to the law, particularly this "sudden peril"
situation, that the issue of Mr. Meyer's negligence was
one to be decided by the jury and that the trial court
would have committed prejudicial error had it directed
liability in favor of the plaintiffs and as against the
defendants as a matter of law. The jury may well have
concluded upon the evidence, and obviously did, that the
danger posed to Mr. Meyer by this Rambler heading
toward 200 West and on a collision course with Meyer's
own vehicle was sufficient to excuse his inattention to
the road ahead of him and for the brief period of time
that he was inattentive. Moreover, the jury may well
have concluded that the period of Meyer's inattention
was indeed brief and that had his attention not been
diverted away by the danger posed by the Rambler that
the accident would not have occurred. The jury may well
have believed that even with the peril from the Rambler
that Meyer was able to slow his vehicle from the speed
it had been traveling and by 15 miles per hour and perhaps more. He was also able to turn his vehicle to the
right and so that only approximately one-half of his
vehicle collided with approximately one-half of the rear
of the other vehicle. On this evidence, the jury may well
have concluded that had Meyer not been diverted by
the Rambler for perhaps one or two seconds that he would
have been able to have stopped or turned and so as to
have completely avoided the accident in question. In
other words, the jury on the Trial Court's instructions
may have concluded that the accident resulted from the
sudden peril of the Rambler rather than from any negligence on Mr. Meyer's part.
8
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Considering all of the evidence and the inferences
that may have been reasonably drawn therefrom by the
jury, it is apparent that this was a case where the jury
was justified in excusing Mr. Meyer's rear-ending of the
Henderson vehicle and because of the "sudden peril'*
that the jury believed resulted from the presence of the
Rambler. Although they do not involve the "sudden peril"
doctrine, it is respectfully submitted that this Court has
held that a jury question exists on an issue of liability
in an automobile accident case and in at least two cases
involving vehicular collisions where any issue of liability
was more doubtful than it is in this instant case. Fairbourn v. Lloyd, 21 Utah 2d 62, 440 P.2d 257; Gibbons v.
Orem City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 184, 493 R2d 1280.
In reviewing the record of this case relating to the
issues of liability, the members of this Court may well
conclude that had they sat on the jury that they would
not have reached the verdict the jury did. Counsel for
the defendants would be less than candid if he did not
admit that the jury verdict came as a surprise to him
and that a contrary verdict had been expected. It was
apparent that counsel for the plaintiff was even more1
surprised in this regard and this expectation possibly
explains his failure to even request of the Court prior
to the submission of the case to the jury that the issues
of liability be withdrawn from the jury and as will be
discussed more fully under Point I I hereafter. Nevertheless, the test is not what is expected or probable,
but it is rather whether there was any competent evidence to support the verdict that was returned. In the
instant case, a unanimous jury found, in effect, that
9
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Ronald Meyer was not negligent. Obviously, the Trial
Judge believed that the jury was within its prerrogative
in reaching that verdict or he would not have submitted
the issues to them, nor would he have allowed the verdict
to stand thereafter and in the face of the post-trial motions that were made by the attorney for the plaintiffs.
On this subject matter of the proper function of the
court and jury and under our judicial system, this
Court had the following to say in the case of Stickle v.
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 122 Utah 477, 251 P.2d
867, at 871:
"Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate
to themselves arbitrary and dangerous powers by
presuming to determine questions of fact which
litigants have a right to have passed upon by
juries. Part of the merits of the jury system is
its safeguarding against such arbitrary power in
the courts. To the great credit of the courts of
this country, they have been extremely reluctant
to infringe upon this right, and by leaving it
unimpaired have kept the administration of justice close to the people. Of course, the rights of
litigants should not be surrendered to the arbitrary will of juries without regard to whether
there is a violation of legal rights as a basis for
recovery. The court does have a duty and a responsibility of supervisory control over the action
of juries which is just as essential to the proper
administration of justice as the function of the
jury itself. Nevertheless, we remain cognizant of
the vital importance of the privilege of trial by
jury in our system of justice and deem it our
duty to zealously protect and preserve it."

10
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POINT II
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MAKE ANY MOTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF
THE EVIDENCE AND THEY ARE NOW FORECLOSED THEREBY FROM CLAIMING THAT THE
ISSUES OF LIABILITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.

Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move for a directed verdict in
his favor and at the close of the evidence. That rule
further provides that "a motion for a directed verdict
shall state the specific ground[s] therefor." Rule 50(b)
U.R.C.P. makes clear that a Motion for a Judgment
N.O.V. is only appropriate where "a motion for a directed
verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or
for any reason is not granted" Rule 50(a) and (b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and upon which
our Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were based, are identical and as they relate to the language of those rules at
issue in the instant case.
As argued under Point I above, defendants contend
that the evidence was ample to justify the Trial Court in
submitting the issues of liability in this case to the jury.
However, and even if this Court were to reject the defendants' argument under Point I above and were to
hold as a matter of law that all reasonable minds must
have concluded on the evidence that Ronald Meyer was
negligent and that his negligence proximately caused the
accident, still, the plaintiffs are now foreclosed to make
that argument. This is so because the plaintiffs failed
to properly request of the Trial Court and at the close
of the evidence, a directed verdict in their favor and as
against the defendants. Not having made that motion or
11
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request anywhere in the record either orally or in writing, the plaintiffs cannot now complain that the issues of
the defendants' liability w^ere improperly submitted to
the jury and because of insufficient evidence. Moreover,
it is very clear from the law that will be hereafter cited
that there is no basis under which the Court could have
granted a Judgment N.O.V. and where a request or motion for a directed verdict was not made at the close of
the evidence and prior to the time the jury retired to
deliberate.
In order to have the complete record of all proceedings in the trial of this case before this Court on appeal,
the defendants designated as record on this appeal not
only the testimony of all witnesses at the trial, but also
"the record of all discussions among counsel, among
counsel and the Court, and every other portion of the
record stenographically transcribed * * * " (Rec. 103).
This was done to conclusively demonstrate to this Court
that at no time upon the record did plaintiffs or their
counsel in writing or orally request of the Trial Court
that it direct a verdict in their favor and in the manner
clearly required by Eule 50(b) U.R.C.P.
It is further true that plaintiff's attorney excepted $o the
course of the trial (not "at the close of the evidence"
as required by Eule 50) did submit his request that the
jury be instructed as follows:
"You are instructed to return a verdict in favor
of plaintiff, Helen L. Henderson, and against
defendants on the issue of liability." (Rec. 26)
It is further true that plaintiffs' attorney excepted to the
Trial Court's failure to give that instruction (without
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law12
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stating any reasons for so excepting) and after the jury
had retired to deliberate (Tr. 196). Of course, following
the trial and within the time permitted by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs did move the Court for
a Judgment N.O.V. or in the alternative for a new trial
and it was then and only then that the plaintiffs ever
contended that the issues of the defendants' liability
should not have been submitted to the jury and on the
grounds that all reasonable minds would have to have
concluded that Ronald Meyer was guilty of negligence as
a matter of law and that his negligence proximately
caused the injuries and damages to the plaintiffs. In
other words, the plaintiffs waited until about one week
after the jury had reached their decision on liability
before it was ever contended to the Trial Court that this
issue of liability wasn't properly before the jury. As will
appear from the cases referred to hereafter, it would be
improper under these circumstances to allow the plaintiffs to now contend that the issues of liability were
improperly submitted to the jury.
The only possible basis that the plaintiffs have for
contending that they made a Motion for a Directed
Verdict in the Trial Court would have to be predicated
upon their requested Instruction No. 1 which is quoted
above. It is interesting to note that the only request
contained in that requested instruction relates to plaintiff, Helen L. Henderson, and no request is made for the
other plaintiff, Walter G. Henderson. Although his claim
is relatively minor and involves only a small amount of
property damage, it is apparent that no possible basis
exists for contending that any motion for a directed verdict was made in his favor and as against the defendants
13
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and even if this Court were to hold that requested Instruction No. 1 qualifies as a Motion for a Directed
Verdict under Rule 50 IJ.R.C.P.
It is also significant to note that not only did the
plaintiffs in this case fail to properly request that the
issues of the defendants' liability be taken from the jury,
but they even submitted instructions to the Trial Court
concerning their theories as to how the issues of Ronald
Meyer's negligence should be presented to the jury.
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 2 defines negligence
and was given by the Court (Rec. 27). Plaintiffs' requested Instruction No. 5 is a detailed statement of the
manner in which the plaintiffs believed Ronald Meyer
to have been negligent and it was also given in substance
by the Court (Rec. 29). I t is submitted that these requested instructions compound the problem that exists
by reason of the plaintiffs' failure to properly move for
a directed verdict. That is, not only wTas no such motion
made, but they then requested that the Trial Court give
instructions on the very subject matter they are now
contending should have been withdrawn from the jury.
Under these circumstances, it is respectfully submitted
that it would be a poor precedent indeed to charge the
Trial Court with prejudicial error in having submitted
the issue of negligence to the jury.
Counsel for defendants has not been able to find any
Utah cases that have interpreted Rule 50 and on the
point at issue. However, there are a number of Federal
cases that have ruled upon this issue and which are
believed to be squarely in point and considering that the
14
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Utah and Federal rules are identical on this subject
matter. Some of these cases are Guglielmo v. Scotti &
Sons, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 413 (1973); Brandon v. Yale and
Towne Manufacturing Company, 220 F. Supp. 855 (1963),
Affirmed per curiam at 342 F.2d 519 (1965); Massaro v.
United States Lines Company, 307 F.2d 299, (1962);
Eisenberg v. Smith, 263 F.2d 827 (1959), Cert. Denied
360 U.S. 918.
In Guglielmo v. Scotti & Sons, Inc., Supra, the Court
held that Federal Rule 50(a) required a party to move
for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence
in order to preserve its right to move for a judgment
N.O.V. after the verdict. In that case, the fact that one
of the parties chose not to move for a directed verdict
at the close of all of the evidence foreclosed any consideration of its later request for a judgment N.O.V. Also,
in that case, the party appealing had made some request
for specific charges to the jury which it claimed had
constituted a motion for a directed verdict. The Court
held otherwise and found that the specificity requirement
of Rule 50(a) had not been met.
In Brandon v. Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, Supra, one of the parties had requested an instruction to the jury which was very similar to the plaintiffs'
requested Instruction No. 1 in the instant case. The
requested instruction from the Brandon case was as
follows:
"Under all the evidence in this case, your verdict
must be in favor of the defendant."

15
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The party who had requested that instruction in the
Brandon case contended that this request constituted a
motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50 F.R.C.P.
The Court held otherwise and stated:
<

"Such a request is unspecific in its terms and
does not meet the requirements of Rule 50(a)
* # #»

This same kind of situation was involved in the case
of Massaro v. United States Lines Company, Supra. In
the Massaro case, the Court had the following to say on
this subject matter:
"United sought, as we have said, judgment n.o.v.
against Northern Metal. But United made no
motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a).
We therefore do not have the question of the sufficiency of the evidence before us. [Citations omitted] A motion for a directed verdict is a prerequisite of a motion for judgment n.o.v. [Citations
omitted]
"We cannot deem United's request for charge
No. 9 as affording it aid in its predicament. Request for charge No. 9 was as follows: 'Under all
of the evidence, your verdict in the third-party
action must be in favor of the third-party plaintiff. Such a request does not meet the requirements of Rule 50(a) for the request in its terms
is unspecific and was made at the beginning of
the trial. It was waived when it was not renewed
at the close of the evidence."
To the same effect is certain language from Eisenberg v. Smith, Supra, which is as follows:
"The Government next says that the plaintiffs
are not entitled to consideration of their motion
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law16
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because
they made no motion for a directed verdict at the
conclusion of the presentation of all the evidence.
F.E. Civ. P. 50(b), 28 U.S.-C., provides that <* * *
a party who has moved for a directed verdict may
move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment
entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict * * #? Rule 50(a) states that 'A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
grounds therefor/ These plaintiffs, in the first
of their requested points for charge to the jury,
did ask for the following: 'On the basis of the
evidence and the applicable law, you are directed
to find a verdict for the Plaintiffs.'
"This request, thrown in along with a considerable
list of points for charge, is not, we think a compliance with the rule as stated in Section 50(a)
and quoted above. It certainly gives the trial
judge no hint of what the position of the party
making the motion is, except that he wants the
lawsuit decided in his favor. The purpose of the
rule requiring the stating of grounds is, of course,
to let the trial judge and opposing counsel see
what the problem is so that the decision will be
the best that can be had. [Citations omitted]"
(Emphasis Supplied)
It is evident that the purpose for requiring compliance with Rule 50 in Utah, as well as in the Federal
system, is as stated above in the language from the
Eisenherg case. How can the trial judge possibly be
expected to take the case from the jury on the issues
of Meyer's negligence and proximate cause where he is
not even requested to do so prior to the jury's retiring
to deliberate and where, in fact, he has been requested
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to instruct the jury on theories of negligence propounded
by the very parties who are now contending that those
issues should never have been submitted to the jury.
Although not squarely in point to the instant case
since the procedural questions raised there were somewhat different than here, it is nevertheless believed that
dicta in the Utah case of Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric
Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393, is helpful to
the resolution of this case. In the Brigham case, this
Court stated at 24 Utah 2d 294:
"An appellate court ought not to do that which
was not requested of the trial court. The recent
case of Price v. Sinnott, 460 P.2d 837, 841 (Nev.
1969), states the law:
'* •* * I t is solidly established that when
there is no request for a directed verdict, the
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the verdict is not reviewable. [Citations omitted] A party may not gamble on
the jury's verdict and then later, when displeased with the verdict, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support it.'
"In the case of Christensen v. Stucklik, 91 Idaho
504, 427 P.2d 278, 280, 281 (1967), the court said:
'The failure of the appellant here to present
to the trial court a motion for directed verdict
not only foreclosed the trial court from consideration of his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but under decisions
interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such failure precludes the appellate
court from reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the verdict. * * *' "
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CONCLUSION
The issues of liability were properly submitted to
the jury under appropriate instructions from the Court
and there was sufficient evidence to justify its verdict
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.
Even if there had not been sufficient evidence, the plaintiffs are in no position to complain at this point and
inasmuch as no Motion for a Directed Verdict at the close
of the evidence was made by the plaintiffs and pursuant
to Rule 50 U.R.C.P.
The judgment based upon the jury verdict should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI
By
David K. Winder
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendamtsBespondents
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